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Abstract
In a federation, local policies with inter-regional spillovers depend on the extent and
the nature of local capture. Local lobbyists who have multi-regional scope internalize
inter-jurisdictional externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests in
a single region. In particular, multi-regional industrial groups lobby for lower inter-
regional trade barriers than local industrial lobbies. The results are based on a simple
model, case-study evidence, and econometric analysis of micro-level panel data from
Russia. Controlling for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects, the performance of ﬁrms increases with
an increase in the number of neighboring regions captured by multiregional groups.
The paper has implications for international trade: lobbying by multinationals should
lead to lower protectionism compared to lobbying by national corporations.
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Public policies conducted by governments in autonomous jurisdictions—be that sovereign
states or sub-national regions of a single country—often impose externalities on other ju-
risdictions. Examples of such policies include trade restrictions, investment in public in-
frastructure, and migration regulations. These externalities are argued to be an important
reason for creating global governance in the context of sovereign states (e.g., de Scitovszky,
1942) and for centralization in the context of regions within federations (e.g., Musgrave,
1969). There is, however, little empirical research on the determinants of the size of these
externalities.
This paper argues that the extent of inter-jurisdictional externalities from policies of
jurisdictions’ governments crucially depends on the geographical scope of the powerful inter-
est groups in the jurisdictions. In particular, multi-jurisdictional interest groups internalize
inter-jurisdictional externalities of local policies to a larger extent than powerful industrial
lobbies with interests in a single jurisdiction. For example, import duties set by the sovereign
states where powerful industrial lobbies are comprised of multinational corporations are lower
than import duties set by the states in which the most powerful interest group is a group of
domestic ﬁrms with no foreign capital. The states with powerful multinational lobbies may
also be less protectionist than states with perfectly accountable, non-captured governments
who oppose trade for ﬁscal reasons or due to terms-of-trade eﬀects. The exact same logic
applies to the imposition of barriers to trade between sub-national regions within federations.
The contribution of this paper is empirical: we test for the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of
the multi-jurisdictional vs. single-jurisdictional scope of politically-powerful lobbyists on
inter-regional spillovers. We use panel data on performance of a large (close-to-population)
sample of large and medium-size ﬁrms in Russia and a unique panel dataset on the regional
vs. multi-regional scope of powerful industrial lobbies in the Russian regions. We show that
performance of an average ﬁrm depends on the presence of powerful regional or multiregional
lobbies in the neighboring regions controlling for a wide variety of factors, including ﬁrm ﬁxed
1eﬀects and macro-economic trends. An increase in the number of regions with governments
under political inﬂuence of multiregional industrial groups compared to having them being
under inﬂuence of regional industrial groups has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on performance
of ﬁrms operating in the same or related industries to the captors of the neighboring re-
gions. Therefore, spillovers from regions captured by multiregional industrial groups are
signiﬁcantly more benign to ﬁrms in the neighboring regions compared to spillovers from
regions captured by regional industrial groups. We also ﬁnd some evidence that spillovers
from regions where governments are not under special interest inﬂuence are less benign
than spillovers from multiregionally-captured regions and more benign that spillovers from
multiregionally-captured regions. But these latter diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the estimation of the reduced-form relationship between
the scope of industrial lobbies in one region and ﬁrm performance in other regions. We have
no systematic data on the actual policies that generate the estimated spillovers. Instead, we
provide anecdotal evidence on the importance on inter-regional trade barriers as a source of
spillovers. We consider three case studies to illustrate that regional industrial groups lobby
for erecting inter-regional trade barriers, whereas multiregional industrial groups lobby for
free trade among regions. In addition, the very same interest groups reversed their stance
from protectionist to pro-trade once they became multiregional.
Russia provides an ideal testing ground for the relationship between interest-group pol-
itics and inter-regional spillovers for the following reasons. First, during 1996-2003—the
period under study—the country was a highly decentralized state in which regional govern-
ments had substantial autonomy over public policy. Second, privatization of the early 1990s
gave rise to a relatively high concentration of wealth and, as a consequence, high degree of
local capture (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 1995, 2001; Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer,
2003; Sonin, 2003).1
1Using the dataset on preferential treatments to large ﬁrms in Russian regional legislation, which is the
main source of information on local capture used in this paper, Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005) show
that (i) regional legislature is subverted by vested interests in many regions; (ii) political inﬂuence generates
substantial gains to captor ﬁrms; and (iii) the extent of capture has an adverse eﬀect on performance of
2Our ﬁndings contribute to the literature on political economy of international trade. The
ﬁrst theoretical analysis of the role of multinational interest groups in liberalizing trade dates
back to Hillman and Ursprung (1993)2 but the empirical literature, however, has emerged
only recently. Our paper is most closely related to Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006)
and Kee, Olarreaga and Silva (2004) who use the approach introduced by Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). In this literature, the relationship
between interest groups politics and trade barriers is tested via estimating a structural
model using an industry-level cross-section of political contributions, trade barriers, and
import penetration shares. The structural model is, in turn, based on the seminal paper
by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006) ﬁnd that trade
barriers in the US industries are negatively correlated with foreign lobbying. Kee, Olarreaga
and Silva (2004) focus on lobbying the US government by Latin American countries and ﬁnd
a similar relationship controlling for country and product characteristics. We study related
questions using a very diﬀerent methodology, which has both advantages and drawbacks
compared to the standard approach. Unlike the empirical trade literature, we do not have
reliable data on trade barriers and, therefore, cannot estimate the structural relationship.
Instead, we use a reduced-form approach to measure the impact of lobbying on foreign ﬁrms
directly without observing variation in trade policy. The main advantages of our approach
are as follows. First, we use ﬁrm-level panel data and, therefore, are able to control for ﬁrm,
industry, and region heterogeneity as well as for macroeconomic trends with ﬁxed eﬀects.
This is in contrast to the existing literature, which so far has been based on cross-sectional
evidence. Second, unlike other papers on this topic, we consider a much more comparable
pool of trade partners which allows us to contain the problem of unobserved heterogeneity:
despite all the disparities across Russian regions, they are much more homogeneous than
sovereign states. Previous literature focused exclusively on foreign lobbying and overlooked
the eﬀect of lobbying by multinational corporations; in contrast, we study the diﬀerence
ﬁrms with no political connections located in the captured regions.
2For a more recent theory, see, for instance, Endoh (2005).
3in the eﬀects of multi-jurisdictional vs. single-jurisdictional lobbies. Thus, we consider our
exercise as a quasi-laboratory experiment for an analysis of the eﬀects of lobbying national
governments by multinationals and domestic ﬁrms. We contribute to the existing literature
by showing that lobbying by multinationals reduces protectionism. This is a complementary
ﬁnding to that of the existing empirical literature on political economy of trade, i.e., that
foreign lobbying reduces barriers to trade.
The paper also contributes to the debate on the beneﬁts and the costs of decentraliza-
tion (Hayek, 1948; Tiebout, 1956; Riker, 1964; Musgrave, 1969; Oates, 1972; Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980). Modern literature is divided on their relative importance in developing
countries.3 Our analysis suggests that the welfare eﬀect of decentralization depends on the
nature of local capture. Decentralization is more beneﬁcial when local governments are cap-
tured by multi-state business groups compared to when they are captured by groups with
interests concentrated in a single state.4
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical framework and
develops empirical predictions. Section 3 provides anecdotal evidence. Section 4 presents
the data and empirical methodology. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 focuses
on robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The purpose of this section is to formulate testable hypotheses. We present a simple partial
equilibrium model that illustrates how the incentives of the captured regional governments
depend on the identity of the captors. The model is a straightforward modiﬁcation of
3One strand (see, for instance, Weingast, 1995; Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995; Qian and Wein-
gast, 1996; Qian and Roland, 1998) emphasizes the conventional beneﬁts of decentralization, such as better
information and stronger accountability at the local level. The other strand (e.g., Tanzi, 1995; Rodden and
Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Cai and Treisman, 2004), in contrast, points out the
costs of decentralization such as increased capture of the state by vested interests and lower internalization of
inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) study the eﬀect of decentralization allowing
for possibility of state capture at both levels of government.
4See Khanna and Yafeh (forthcoming in 2007) for a discussion why business groups—that are usually
blamed for destroying value in developed economies—may play a useful role in emerging markets.
4a standard textbook analysis of an optimal tariﬀ in a large country (e.g., Krugman and
Obstfeld, 1991). We focus on inter-regional trade barriers, but the results would hold for any
regulation protecting captors from their out-of-region competitors: non-tariﬀ trade barriers,
regulation of product, capital, and labor markets, or subsidies. The main idea of the model
is as follows: if captors have a stake in ﬁrms located outside the region, they are less inclined
to lobby for policies with negative externalities on other regions.
2.1 A simple model
We consider a partial equilibrium model of trade. Consider a region which imports a trade-
able good from the rest of the country’s regions. We will refer to this region as “Home” region
and to the rest of the country’s regions as “Abroad.” Let P and P ∗ denote the price of the
good at Home and Abroad, respectively. The demand for the good at Home is D(P) = 1−P;
the demand Abroad is D∗(P ∗) = 1 − P ∗. The supply of the good at Home is S(P) = aP
and the supply Abroad is S∗(P ∗) = a∗P ∗, where a∗ > a.5
The government of the home region sets τ to maximize the weighted average of consumer
surplus of home consumers CS, tariﬀ revenues TR, and producer surplus PS (a la Baldwin,
1987; Bagwell and Staiger, 2006). Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide microfoundations
for this utility function.
The tariﬀ revenues and consumer surplus enter the government’s objective function with
the weight 1 while the producer surplus enters with the weight γ ≥ 1. The parameter
γ reﬂects the extent to which the Home government is under the inﬂuence of the local
industrial lobby, i.e., domestic producers. If γ = 1, there is no “state capture” and the
Home government maximizes social welfare. We shall assume that the industrial lobby in
addition to being an owner of the 100 percent of domestic industry also owns µ ∈ [0,1)
5This assumption is necessary to generate trade between regions. An alternative would be to consider a
diﬀerentiated good produced by ﬁrms at Home and Abroad, varieties of which are demanded both at Home
and Abroad. This model is a straightforward generalization of the model in Hillman and Ursprung (1993)
allowing for diﬀerentiated goods. This alternative model produces very similar results in terms of our main
empirical prediction but requires more complex math. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we opt for the model
with a homogenous good.
5share of the ﬁrms Abroad. Thus, in the case of local capture, the total producer surplus
that belongs to the captors is PS + µPS∗ and the home-region government maximizes
CS + TR + γ(PS + µPS∗).
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Solving for P and P ∗, we ﬁnd P =
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2+a+a∗ . The imports into the Home
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The Home government chooses the tariﬀ to maximize:
W = TR + CS + γ (PS + µPS











This is a quadratic function of τ; the ﬁrst order condition implies
b τ =
2(1 + a∗)(1 + γa) − (1 + a)(2 + a + a∗) − 2γµa∗(1 + a)
2(1 + a)(1 + a∗)(2 + a + a∗) − (1 + a∗)2(1 + γa) − (1 + a)2γµa∗. (2)
The second-order condition is equivalent to both numerator and denominator in (2) being
positive (otherwise, the optimal tariﬀ is either prohibitive τ = τ or trivial τ = 0).
Our main interest is in deriving comparative statics with regard to the extent of capture
γ and the weight of multi-regional interests µ. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the optimal tariﬀ
as a function of µ and γ. We summarize comparative statics in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal tariﬀ τ is:
(i) weakly decreasing in the weight of multi-regional interests µ for a given level of local
capture γ;
6(ii) weakly increasing in γ for a given level of γµ;
(iii) weakly increasing in γ for a given level of µ if µ is suﬃciently small: µ <
1+1/a∗
1+1/a .6
Proof. We shall use monotone comparative statics. The second derivatives of the objective
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is positive, we directly obtain the claims (i) and (ii).
The sign of ∂2W
∂γ∂τ depends on the magnitude of µ. If the extent of multiregional interests is
relatively small µ <
(1+a∗)aP
(1+a)a∗P∗ then it is positive and the tariﬀ increases with γ. As P ≥ P ∗,




1+1/a < 1. Q.E.D.
The intuition is straightforward. For a given level of capture γ, the higher the out-of-
region component in the group interests, the more they beneﬁt from tariﬀ reduction. For a
given level of their interest Abroad µ, the eﬀect of the extent of capture γ on policy depends
on two countervailing forces. On one hand, the lobbies want to restrain competition to
increase their domestic producer surplus. On the other hand, the lobbyists want to promote
trade to raise their producer surplus abroad. As long as µ is suﬃciently small, the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates.
Remark 1. The tariﬀ is positive even if there is no capture γ = 1 and µ = 0. Due to the
terms-of-trade eﬀect, the benevolent regional government sets a non-trivial tariﬀ:
τB =
a∗ − a
(3 + 2a + a∗)(1 + a∗)
.
If the benevolent government knows that producers have a positive stake µ > 0 in the foreign







2−τ(1+a) , where τ is the optimal tariﬀ.
7producer surplus then the tariﬀ will actually be lower
a∗−a−2a∗µ
(3+2a+a∗)(1+a∗)−(1+a)a∗µ and may even
be trivial if µ ≥ (a∗ − a)/(2a∗).
How does the global welfare depend on parameters? It is impossible to provide a complete
answer within a partial equilibrium model. Yet, if the region is suﬃciently small compared
to the whole country, it is clear that eliminating trade barriers increases the welfare. Once
we neglect the eﬀect of the policies in a given market on other markets, the global welfare be-
comes simply TR+CS+PS+PS∗ which is maximized at τ = 0. In this sense, multiregional
interest groups deliver greater social welfare than local ones.
2.2 Testable predictions
The main prediction of our simple model is that multiregional captors—business groups
with special interests that span over several regions—set lower tariﬀs compared to regional
captors (industrial lobbyists with interests only in their home region). In addition, the model
predicts that regional captors set higher tariﬀs than non-captured governments. These two
predictions are clear cut and testable.
In general, we cannot generate a prediction with regard to the comparison between non-
captured governments and multi-regional capture. Our analysis implies that, for a given
level of µ, the tariﬀs increase with the level of capture γ only if µ is small. Moreover, even
though small µ may be a realistic assumption, this prediction is hard to test empirically:
we cannot measure (and, therefore, control for) µ in the non-captured regions. To construct
a proxy for µ we need to observe regional-vs-multiregional scope of business interests. It
is feasible in a captured region where the captors are few and known. In a non-captured
region, we would need the data on ultimate ownership of all ﬁrms which are not available.
The logic of the model can be generalized to any regional regulation or other regional
policy that aﬀects business interests and imposes inter-jurisdictional externalities. Another
example of such a policy is investment in infrastructure that connects diﬀerent regions,
e.g., roads, railroads, or communications. (In particular, vertically-integrated groups may
8lobby for building public roads to connect their production units. Naturally, multiregional
industrial groups would lobby for better roads compared to regional groups; other ﬁrms
located along the road would also beneﬁt.) When lobbying for regional policies, multiregional
industrial groups should internalize inter-jurisdictional spillovers to a larger extent than
regional lobbies. Therefore, we expect to see relatively low negative spillovers and relatively
high positive spillovers from regions captured by multiregional industrial groups than from
regions captured by regional industrial groups.
In this paper we abstract from the question of how the (multiregional vs. regional) type
of capture aﬀects domestic non-captors. Our theory does not produce a clear prediction
which would hold for diﬀerent kinds of public policy. On the one hand, domestic ﬁrms
beneﬁt from local lobbies restricting competition from outside the region (for this reason,
they would prefer regional to multiregional capture). On the other hand, the multiregional
lobbies promote infrastructure investment that can help domestic ﬁrms export abroad (for
this reason, they would prefer multiregional to regional capture). Note that, in contrast to
domestic ﬁrms, for the foreign ﬁrms these two eﬀects work in the same direction.
Since we do not have data on regional trade barriers and there are other policies with
inter-regional spillovers, we test the predictions of the model directly, i.e., by estimating the
eﬀect of capture on the very spillovers rather than the eﬀect on trade barriers. Our tests
estimate the eﬀect of all policies that have regional spillovers on ﬁrm performance. Trade
barriers, however, are an important policy that imposes inter-jurisdictional externalities. In
the next section, we provide anecdotal evidence on how regional trade policies ﬁt the model.
3 Case study evidence on trade barriers
Inter-regional trade barriers are a pervasive phenomenon for many large developing and
transition countries. For example, Young (2000); Poncet (2004) provide many anecdotes
as well as systematic evidence of inter-provincial barriers in the transitional China. In
9Russia, media provides numerous stories in which vodka-producing regions institute barriers
to trade in regional alcohol markets. For example, in the late 1990s, republic of Udmurtia,
Riazan oblast, Astrahan oblast, and Yakutia republic passed regional laws that obliged
alcohol retailers to have at least a certain percent of their sales be from products produced
by local alcohol producers (e.g., 80% in Yakutia republic); whereas Vladimir oblast, Saratov
oblast, and Penza oblast maintain sizable tariﬀs on vodka produced outside of these regions.7
Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) show that the patterns of price dispersion in Russia suggested
the existence of substantial interregional trade barriers in 1990s. Inter-regional trade barriers
arise in developed countries as well; see, for instance, Craig and Sailors (1987) on trade
restrictions among the US states and a report of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce
(CCC, 2004) on inter-provincial trade barriers in Canada. Below, we consider three case
studies from Russia to illustrate the main prediction of the model.
3.1 Uralelektromed
Uralelectromed is the largest copper reﬁnery in Russia; the only copper reﬁnery and the
fourth largest company in Sverdlovsk Oblast, a region in the Urals in Russia. Uralelectromed
was politically very powerful in Sverdlovsk Oblast throughout the 1990s. In the spring of
1996, it successfully lobbied for introducing a regional export tariﬀ on products containing
precious metals which are its main input. The tariﬀ signiﬁcantly hurt the neighboring Cheli-
abinsk Oblast, since its main copper reﬁnery—Kyshtymsky copper-electrolytic plant—relied
on inputs produced in Sverdlovsk Oblast by Sredneuralsky copper-melting plant. After the
introduction of the tariﬀ, Uralelectromed became the only proﬁtable customer of Sredneu-
ralsky. At the time, Iskander Makhmudov, the controlling owner of Uralelectromed, did
not own other assets. In the second half of 1996, Iskander Makhmudov started building a
vertically-integrated copper group which had later become one of the largest Russian business
groups UGMK (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). Once the Makhmudov’s group grew beyond
7The source of these data is the comprehensive database of regional laws and regulations in Russia,
“Consultant Plus” (www.consultant.ru).
10Sverdlovsk oblast, the export tariﬀ on products containing precious metals was abolished.8
3.2 Tatneft vs. Lukoil
Throughout the second half of 1990s and in the beginning of 2000s, Tatarstan Republic,
a Russia’s region on the Volga river, witnessed a major conﬂict of lobbyists over tariﬀ re-
strictions on gasoline imports into the region. The two main players in this conﬂict were
Tatneft, the fourth largest oil company in Russia with all major assets located in Tatarstan,
and Lukoil, the largest oil ﬁrm in Russia at that time with extraction plants and reﬁner-
ies located in many regions. In 1998, active lobbying by Tatneft (the most powerful ﬁrm
in the region’s politics) led Governor Shaimiev to prepare a decree that aimed at severely
restricting gasoline imports into Tatarstan. To prevent the decree from taking eﬀect, Lukoil
threatened Governor Shaimiev with stopping to reﬁne Tatneft’s oil. Tatneft did not have
its own oil reﬁnery then. The decree was not passed. In 2000, Tatneft built its own reﬁnery
and, therefore, could no longer be threatened. As a result, it successfully lobbied for an
institution of gasoline import restrictions. Having no more leverage inside the region, Lukoil
had to complain to Sergei Kirienko, the Russian President’s Plenipotentiary in the Volga
region about these trade restrictions. Since obstruction of inter-regional trade contradicts
federal law, the federal government abolished the restrictions. Only the direct intervention
of the federal government relaxed the gasoline import duties in Tatarstan.9
3.3 Russia’s Beer
In 1996-2002, beer was produced in 72 to 76 (depending on a year) out of 89 regions of
Russia. The industry consisted of the two market leaders, Baltic Beverages Holding (BBH)
and Sun Interbrew and hundreds of small regional breweries.10 BBH and Sun Interbrew
8For the account of this story, see, for instance, Segodnia (October 4, 1996).
9For the account of this war, see, for instance, Russky Telegraph (July 28, 1998) and Vecherniaya Kazan
(October 4, 2002).
10Sun Interbrew was formed in 1999 after the merger of Sun Breweries and Interbrew; before 1999, Sun
Breweries was one of the two market leaders. Other large producers, e.g., Efes, SABMiller, or Heineken, had
11had production facilities in 13 regions (7 and 9, respectively). Regional breweries targeted
exclusively local markets and lobbied regional governments to erect barriers for import of
beer produced outside their region. BBH and Sun Interbrew, on the other hand, were not
interested in erecting trade barriers even in the regions where they had production plants
because of product diﬀerentiation: Typically, a regional branch of BBH or Sun Interbrew
brewed some of group’s national brands and few local brands some of which were subse-
quently marketed to become national brands.11 In order to take advantage of the economies
of scale in production and marketing, BBH and Sun Interbrew moved away from duplicating
brands at the plant level and preferred to ship the products to other regions (even those
regions where they had own production facilities). Regional governments’ main instrument
for restriction of beer imports from other regions was the legislation on “licensing and ac-
creditation” of beer retailers. Often, these laws included provisions restricting sale of beer
produced in other regions of the country.
Yakovlev (2005) coded the content of the regional licensing and accreditation laws for
75 regions between 1996 and 2003, i.e., 600 region*year observations.12 Out of these 600
region*year observations, multiregional beer producers had operational production facilities
in 78 cases. In 65 out of 600 cases, the laws erected severe trade barriers for beer imports.
It is striking that in the regions and years when a multiregional beer producer was present,
regional laws never stipulated trade restrictions.
One may argue that the causality between the presence of multiregional brewing compa-
nies and regional trade barriers works in the opposite direction: multiregional groups may
not able to enter regions where local breweries are successful lobbyists. To address this, let
us consider trade barriers which were introduced after both BBH and Sun-Interbrew estab-
lished plants in all 13 regions of their current presence. Between 1999 and 2003, 7 out of
little presence in Russia before 2002.
11A good example of a local brand that later became one of the national champions is Sun-Interbrew’s
“Sibirskaya Korona.” It was launched as a local brand in Omsk but now sells throughout the country.
12The dataset excludes war-aﬀected Chechnya and Ingushetia and so-called autonomous okrugs which are
parts of other regions; data on the autonomous okrugs are very scarce.
1262 regions which had no multiregional companies, introduced new import restrictions. In
contrast, none of the 13 regions which had production plants of BBH and Sun-Interbrew did
this.
Discussion
All the three pieces of anecdotal evidence are consistent with the model: trade restrictions
arise in regions were politically-powerful lobbyists have their business interests concentrated
within regional borders and do not arise where lobbyists’ interests span over multiple re-
gions. Even in the Tatneft case where Tatneft initially did not own the assets outside its
home regions, reliance on an independent reﬁneries in other regions forced it to care for the
interregional trade and to act as a multiregional ﬁrm.
In the remainder of the paper, we test whether there is a systematic diﬀerence in spillovers
from the regions captured by regional industrial interests, the regions captured by multire-
gional industrial interests, and the non-captured regions.
4 Empirical methodology and the data
4.1 Data
For each region in Russia in each year between 1996 and 2003, we construct a variable which
indicates whether the region was captured by a regional industrial group, captured by a
multiregional industrial group, or non-captured using data from three sources.
1. We draw information on the extent of local capture and the names of ﬁrms that were
local captors from the dataset on preferential treatment of large ﬁrms by regional
legislation constructed and described by Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005).
2. We identify whether in 2003 local captors belonged to an industrial group that had
regional or multiregional scope using data on industrial groups collected and described
13by Guriev and Rachinsky (2005). For each large ﬁrm in Russia, the dataset identiﬁes
the ultimate controlling owner in 2003. The data allow us to track whether the most
politically-powerful ﬁrms in each region—who are the recipients of preferential treat-
ments in Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005) dataset—belonged to a controlling
owner who had productive assets in multiple regions or in a single region.
3. Since data from Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) are a cross-section, we collected ad-
ditional time series information on controlling owners of each ﬁrm-captor (i.e., each
recipient of preferential treatment) between 1996 and 2003 using “Labyrinth” dataset
that contains detailed histories of most large Russian companies.
We relegate the detailed description of each of these three dataset to the Appendix.
A region in a particular year is deﬁned to be captured by an interest group of a particular
type–regional or multiregional–whenever: (i) the region is captured, i.e., the number of
preferential treatments given out to ﬁrms in that region and that particular year is greater
than zero; and (ii) at least 50% of all preferential treatments go to ﬁrms controlled by groups
of a particular type, i.e., regional or multiregional. A region in a particular year is said to
be not captured if there were no preferential treatments that year in that region. Table A.1
in the Appendix presents the lists of regions by type of their captor over time.13 There are
103 cases (i.e., regions*years) of multiregional capture, 285 cases of regional capture, and
200 cases of no capture.
We concentrate on estimating spillovers from neighboring regions. Thus, for that purpose,
for each region, we construct variables measuring the total number of neighboring regions
and the numbers of neighboring regions that are (i) captured by regional groups, (ii) captured
by multiregional groups, or (iii) non-captured. Table A.2 in Appendix presents these data.
We are interested in how spillovers from regional policies aﬀect performance of an average
ﬁrm. The outcomes that we look at are growth in sales, productivity, employment, ﬁxed as-
13We are unable to classify several regions according to the type of capture because these regions are
missing from the Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005) dataset due to the absence of information about
laws of these regions in the legal database “Consultant Plus.”
14sets, and return on sales (controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and industry-speciﬁc time trends).
The data on these basic performance indicators for 1995-2004 come from the Russian Enter-
prise Registry Longitudinal dataset (RERLD) which covers the basic ﬁnancial statistics for
about 80% of large and medium-size ﬁrms in Russia. Summary statistics for performance
variables are presented in Table A.3 in Appendix.
4.2 Empirical speciﬁcation
Our aim is to estimate how the extent of inter-jurisdictional spillovers depends on the scope
of local special interests. The estimation strategy is as follows: we compare the average
performance of ﬁrms depending on whether neighboring regions are (i) captured by regional
groups, (ii) captured by multiregional groups, or (iii) non-captured controlling for ﬁrms’
ﬁxed eﬀects and other covariates (to be described below). If multiregional groups internalize
inter-jurisdictional externalities to a larger extent than regional groups, ﬁrm performance
should be higher under multiregional capture of the neighboring regions.
We look at the capture in the neighboring regions because we assume that spillovers are
higher between neighbors than between regions that are far away from each other. This is
true both for trade and for infrastructure externalities. For example, if inter-regional trade
barriers are the source of spillovers, gravity model (Linnemann, 1966) would predict higher
eﬀect on immediate geographical neighbors.
As our model is a partial equilibrium one, all predictions of the model are about the
spillovers on ﬁrms in the same or related industries to the industry of the captors. The
multiregional captor would lobby for more benign regulation towards the same industry,
if she has a stake in ﬁrms in that industry, or towards the industries she trades with, if
the captor is vertically integrated as most of Russian industrial groups are (see Guriev and
Rachinsky, 2005). It is important to emphasize that we assume that policy and, therefore,
its spillovers are industry-speciﬁc rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Under this assumption, captors
cannot design regulations that would beneﬁt only their foreign subsidiaries; they can only
15reduce tariﬀs or relax regulations that hurt all the ﬁrms in the targeted industry. We deﬁne
ﬁrm f to have a “related” industry to the industries of the ﬁrms-captors of the neighboring
regions if the f’s industry has suﬃciently high volume of trade with at least one of the
industries of the neighboring captors or the f’s industry is the same as of at least one
of the neighboring captors. The information on trade between industries is from the two-
digit industry-level input-output table (constructed by the oﬃcial Russia’s statistical agency,
Rosstat using Rosstat’s OKONH industry classiﬁcation). We estimate the spillover eﬀects
on both “related” and “unrelated” industries.
Using a representative sample of large and medium-size registered ﬁrms in Russia, we
estimate the following panel regression with ﬁxed eﬀects for each ﬁrm:













where f indexes ﬁrms; r indexes regions in which ﬁrm f is located; t indexes years; φf and
ρt are the ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively.
The dependent variable, Yft, is one of the following measures of performance: logs of
productivity, return on sales, ﬁxed assets, employment, and sales. The main independent
variables are: CMR
rt , which is the number of neighboring regions of the region r that are
captured by multinational groups; CNO
rt , which is the number of neighboring regions of
the region r that are not captured; Uft, which is a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm
f’s industry is unrelated to the industries of ﬁrms who are the captors of the neighboring
regions; and the interaction terms between the “unrelated industry” dummy, Uft, and “type
of neighboring capture” variables, CMR
rt and CNO
rt .
Thus, α1 estimates the eﬀect of an increase in the number of neighbors captured by
multiregional groups on performance of an average ﬁrm in an industry related to industries
of the neighbor’s captors. And α2 estimates the diﬀerence between the eﬀects of an increase
in the number of neighbors captured by multiregional groups for ﬁrms in unrelated and
related industries. Our main hypothesis in terms of estimated coeﬃcients is as follows:
16α1 > 0, i.e., the higher the multiregional scope of lobbyists in the neighboring regions,
the better the performance of ﬁrms in related industries. In addition, for trade-related
externalities, we expect the eﬀect of an increase in multiregional lobbying of neighboring
regions to be weakened for ﬁrms in unrelated industries, i.e., α2 < 0 (since spillovers reach
ﬁrms in “unrelated” industries only indirectly through capital and labor markets, rather
than through product markets).
Similarly, α3 and α4 estimate the eﬀect of an increase in the number of non-captured
neighbors on performance of an average ﬁrm in related industry and the diﬀerence in the
eﬀect of an increase in the number of non-captured neighbors for ﬁrms in unrelated and
related industries. Again, we expect α3 > 0 and, possibly, α4 < 0.
Notice that the estimated eﬀects are relative to having neighbors captured by regional
groups because we look at the eﬀect of an increase in the number of multiregionally-captured
neighbors holding the number of non-captured neighbors constant and, vice versa, we look
at the eﬀect of an increase in the number of non-captured neighbors holding the number of
multiregionally-captured neighbors constant. The total number of neighbors is controlled
for by ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects as ﬁrms do not change location in our data.
We include several ﬁrm-level and region-level covariates denoted by Zft and Xrt, respec-
tively. Vectors Z and X include the following regressors. We control for industry-speciﬁc
trends with interactions of linear time trends with industry dummies. To make sure that our
results are not driven by the diﬀerences in industrial structure of regions that are captured by
regional and multiregional groups, we include controls for the shares of total regional indus-
trial production produced by machinery, electricity, extraction, and food industries both for
the region r and its neighbors. We control for the extent of local capture in the neighboring
regions of region r with the mean number of preferential treatments and mean concentra-
tion of preferential treatments among the neighbors as was done in Slinko, Yakovlev and
Zhuravskaya (2005). Since performance of ﬁrms may be inﬂuenced by the extent and type
of local capture in their own region, we control for the number of preferential treatments
17in region r as well as their concentration and multiregional vs. regional type. We allow for
clusters in error terms at the level of regions. Finally, we drop outlier-observations from the
sample deﬁned as observations with residuals of performance of ﬁrms on our control variables
which are above the 99th or below the 1st percentile of their distribution.
It is important to note that our estimation strategy treats the type of capture of the
neighboring regions as exogenous to performance of an average ﬁrm. We are comfortable
with this assumption because the allocation of preferential treatments in a region depends
on what is going on in that region and certainly not on performance of ﬁrms outside that
region. The results are robust to exclusion of control variables that describe the region r
(which, therefore, potentially can be endogenous to ﬁrm performance in the same region). In
section 6, we discuss potential alternative stories and robustness of the results to alterations
in the set of covariates.
In addition, it is worth noting that we do not estimate the eﬀect of capture on the
captors themselves; using the very same dataset, Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005)
have shown that captors do beneﬁt from the capture. For clarity’s sake, we exclude the
captors from our sample.
Speciﬁcation (3) explores within-region variation in the identity of industrial lobbies
because it includes ﬁxed eﬀects for ﬁrms and, therefore, also ﬁxed eﬀects for regions as ﬁrms
in our sample do not change location. The advantages of running panel regressions with ﬁxed
eﬀects are obvious compared to cross-sectional regressions. Yet, cross-sectional variation in
regional vs. multiregional scope of local capture is vast. Thus, we want to verify whether our
main results hold in cross-section as well. For that purpose, we run the following between-
eﬀects regression, i.e., OLS regression of de-trended over-time averages, controlling for the
initial level of dependent variable:
¯ Yf = α+α0Yft=1995+α1 ¯ C
MR
r +α2Uf ¯ C
MR
r +α3 ¯ C
NO







The upper bar denotes over-time averages between 1996 to 2003 of the residuals from linear
18regressions of the corresponding variables (described above) on time dummies.14 In order
to look at changes in performance, we include the initial level of the dependent variable,
Yft=1995, as one of covariates. Uf is a dummy that indicates whether the ﬁrm f is in the
industry which is unrelated to any captors in the neighboring regions throughout the whole
period 1996-2003. The set of controls (˜ Z and ˜ X) includes over-time averages of covariates
used in speciﬁcation 3 and, in addition, the following cross-sectional controls: the number
of neighboring regions, average exposure of the region r to trade (measured by the average
share of exports plus imports in total industrial output), dummy for state ownership of the
ﬁrm f, the initial share of people with higher education in region r and its initial gross-
regional product per capita, a dummy indicating whether the region r has a special “ethnic
republic” status in the federation, and 3-digit industry dummies. In addition, in regressions
for productivity and return on sales we control for the size of ﬁrms with contemporary sales,
as productivity and proﬁtability vary a lot with size. As above, we adjust standard error to
allow for cluster in error terms at the level of regions.
5 Empirical results
The results of the ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions are presented in Table 1. Our main hypothesis
is supported by the data. A change from regional to multiregional capture of a region is
associated with higher ﬁrm performance in other regions. The estimates of the coeﬃcients
on the number of neighbors captured by multiregional groups are positive and signiﬁcant for
all performance measures except the return on sales. In particular, an increase in the number
of neighboring regions captured by multiregional groups by one (equivalent to a decrease in
the number of neighboring regions captured by regional groups by one) leads to the following
statistically signiﬁcant changes in the performance of an average ﬁrm in an industry related
to industries of the captors in an average region: it experiences a 1.3% productivity increase,
14Thus, as above, ¯ Y stands for the level of sales, employment, return on sales, and productivity. In contrast
to the level of ﬁxed assets used in speciﬁcation 3, in speciﬁcation 4 we use annual change in assets to reﬂect
diﬀerences in investment patterns.
19a 2% increase in sales, a 1.4% increase in employment, and a 1.5% increase in ﬁxed capital
stock. The eﬀect on returns on sales is much smaller, negative, and insigniﬁcant; but this
variable is based on the accounting proﬁts data, which are believed to be unreliable.
In contrast, there is no signiﬁcant and robust eﬀect of a change in the type of capture in
the neighboring regions on ﬁrms operating in unrelated industries. (The diﬀerence between
the eﬀects for ﬁrms in related and unrelated industries, α2, is negative for four out of ﬁve
outcome variables and statistically signiﬁcant for productivity and sales. As the sum of
the coeﬃcients α1 and α2 shows, in most cases the own eﬀect on unrelated industries is
insigniﬁcant and close to zero.)
Unlike the multiregional capture of neighbors, an increase in the number of non-captured
neighbors (holding the number of multiregionally-captured neighbors constant) does not re-
sult in a signiﬁcant boost in ﬁrm performance. The sign of the estimates of four out of ﬁve
coeﬃcients on the number of non-captured neighbors is positive indicating that spillovers
from non-captured regions are only insigniﬁcantly better than from regionally-captured re-
gions. As above, there is no robust pattern for the eﬀect of an increase in the number of
non-captured neighbors for ﬁrms in unrelated industries.
In most cases, the magnitude of the eﬀect of an increase in multiregionally-captured
neighbors is larger than that of an increase in non-captured neighbors; yet, the diﬀerence in
magnitude is statistically signiﬁcant only for the eﬀect on employment.
Overall, as predicted by our simple model, we ﬁnd that spillovers from regions with
multiregional interest groups are signiﬁcantly more benign than from regions with interest
groups that have interests in a single region.
We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence that positive spillovers from non-captured regions are
larger than that of regionally-captured regions and smaller than multiregionally-captured
regions. The latter result is consistent with evidence on China presented by Young (2000)
and Poncet (2004). These papers argue that Chinese province leaders erect inter-province
trade barriers to protect their own rents (as opposed to rents of industrial lobbies). Partic-
20ularly, Poncet shows that regional protectionism is partly explained by political incentives
of provincial governments to maximize tax collection and to avoid social unrest from closing
down ineﬃcient local ﬁrms (a la Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). It is important to note that
there is no clear prediction for the diﬀerence between the eﬀects multiregionally-captured
and non-captured neighbors (see the discussion in Section 2.2).
The results of between-eﬀects regressions are presented in Table 2. Again, we ﬁnd that
spillovers from regions captured by multiregional groups are signiﬁcantly more benign to
ﬁrms in related-to-captors industries in the neighboring regions compared to spillovers from
regions captured by regional groups. There is no eﬀect on ﬁrms in unrelated industries.
Thus, the main prediction of our model is conﬁrmed by cross-section estimates as well as
by panel estimates. The magnitude of cross-sectional estimates of the eﬀects is larger: an
increase in the average share of multiregionally-captured neighbors leads to a 16% increase
in productivity, a 27% increase in sales, a 14% increase in investment, 13% increase in
employment, and 5% increase in return on sales in ﬁrms operating in related industries. This
increase in magnitude of coeﬃcients should be expected. The between-eﬀects speciﬁcation
provides estimates for the long-run eﬀect of spillovers in contrast to the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates
which are for the short-run eﬀects. In the ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions we look at the annual
changes in the type of capture and in ﬁrm performance, whereas in between eﬀects estimation,
we look at the eight-year-long horizon.
As our model predicts, the estimated spillovers from regions that are not captured are
signiﬁcantly more benign than spillovers from regions captured by regional industrial groups.
In contrast to ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation, this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. In addition,
the estimated coeﬃcients of the eﬀect of an increase in the share of non-captured neigh-
bors turns out to be larger in magnitude than the eﬀect of an increase in the share of
multiregionally-captured neighbors, but that latter diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Overall, we ﬁnd strong support for our main hypothesis.
216 Robustness
In this section we consider robustness of our results and possible alternative explanations for
them.
One could argue that multiregional and regional captors are diﬀerent in other dimensions
in addition to geographical scope of their interest and that our results are driven by those
very diﬀerences.
First, could it be that multiregional and regional groups have diﬀerent capacity of in-
ﬂuencing regional authorities, i.e., political power of these two types of lobbyists diﬀer? To
address this question, we compared the number of preferential treatments received by all
ﬁrms in regional and multiregional groups from the Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) dataset.
It turns out that likelihood of getting treated preferentially by regional authorities does not
depend on whether a ﬁrm in controlled by a multiregional or a regional group. The main
predictor of whether a ﬁrm is treated preferentially is its size. We also checked that the
interaction between the size of the ﬁrm and the multiregional vs. regional scope of the
controlling owner of the ﬁrm does not have any predictive power for the likelihood of being
treated preferentially. Moreover, in our regressions we always control for political power
of lobbyists with the average number and average concentration of preferential treatments
among neighbors.
Second, multiregional and regional lobbyists may not be uniformly distributed across
diﬀerent industries, whereas diﬀerent industries may have diﬀerent spillover eﬀects. For ex-
ample, being located next to a region that produces cheap hydro electricity may be beneﬁcial
for power-intensive manufacturing ﬁrms. Indeed, it turns out that there are important dif-
ferences in industrial composition of captors who are members of multiregional groups vs.
regional groups: multiregional owners are prevalent among captors from non-ferrous metals,
coal, and diamond industries, whereas regional owners are prevalent among captors from ma-
chinery, timber, and food industries. (Captors in other industries do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
by multiregional vs. regional type of their owners.) To control for the potential industry-
22related spillover eﬀects, we include industrial composition of the neighboring regions and
of the own region into our baseline regressions. It is worth noting, however, that most of
the industry eﬀects are picked up by ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects and, therefore, our estimates of
ﬁxed eﬀects regressions do not depend on the presence of these controls. In between eﬀects
speciﬁcation, however, these controls are important and they are included.
Another possible alternative story behind our results is as follows. When a member of
a group receives preferential treatment, the beneﬁts of this preferential treatment may be
spread among all members of the group. Therefore, ﬁrms-members of multiregional groups,
other members of which receive preferential treatment in the neighboring regions, may enjoy
beneﬁts of these preferential treatments. In order to rule this out as a possible driving force
of the results, we excluded members of groups (other members of which are captors) from
the sample. This did not have any eﬀect on our results. One could argue, however, that
preferential treatment given to members of a group may not only have a direct eﬀect on
other members of the same group located in other regions but also hurt their competitors
(which are also located in other regions). To address this, we tried including a dummy that
equals one if the region has ﬁrms-members of multiregional groups that capture neighboring
regions. Addition of this covariate also did not change our results. It is worth noting that
this story (if important) would bias out coeﬃcients downwards, and, therefore, work against
our predictions.
We also tried to include many other control variables for the own region and neighboring
regions. In particular, the exclusion of all controls for own region—which may be endogenous
to ﬁrm performance in the region—does not change the main results. Overall, the results
seem to be very robust to any alterations in the set of covariates.
237 Conclusions
Our main ﬁnding is that in a federation, local public policy with inter-jurisdictional spillovers
depends on whether business interests of local lobbies span over many regions or are con-
centrated in a single region. Multi-jurisdictional lobbies internalize spillovers between juris-
dictions to a larger extent than the local lobbies. We show that performance of an average
ﬁrm signiﬁcantly improves if neighboring regions are captured by multiregional (compared
to regional) industrial lobbies. Regions with governments not captured by any industrial
interests generate spillovers that are in between the ones from regions captured by regional
and multiregional interests; yet, these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The results suggest that political inﬂuence of large (multi-jurisdictional) businesses may
help alleviating one of the main costs of decentralization in large federations—inter-jurisdictional
spillovers—particularly, when there are no institutional constraints on behavior of local pub-
lic oﬃcials such as strong national political parties (Riker, 1964), as is the case in Russia.
Our ﬁndings also have implications for the political economy of international trade. Coun-
tries where trade policy is shaped by multinationals are more likely to internalize interna-
tional externalities and therefore be less protectionist. There are obvious diﬀerences between
interregional trade in a federation and international trade; yet, the former provides a robust
testing ground for the latter. While cross-country analysis suﬀers from the biases due to
inconsistencies of the data and omitted variables, our empirical exercise is set up in a more
homogenous environment.
Throughout the paper, we take the structure of lobbies for granted and do not allow
for endogenous emergence of lobbies. Future research should analyze political economy of
interest group formation taking into account the distinctions between multi-jurisdictional
and single-jurisdictional interest groups.
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Figure 1: The optimal tariﬀ τ as a function of the weight of multi-regional interests µ for








Figure 2: The optimal tariﬀ τ as a function of the degree of capture γ for the weight of
multi-regional interests µ ranging from µ = 0 to µ = 0.5.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Capture and captors in Russian regions
The database contains an account of all preferential treatments between 1992 and 2003 given by regional
legislators and regulators to 978 ﬁrms in Russia. Firms were chosen on the basis of being among the ﬁve
largest ﬁrms at least once during 1992 - 2003 in any Russian region. An enterprize was said to be treated
preferentially if it received any of the following beneﬁts: tax breaks, investment credits, subsidies, subsidized
loans and loans with a regional budget guarantee, oﬃcial delays in tax payments, subsidized licensing, free
grants of state property, or a special “open economic zone” status for their territory. The number of regional
laws and regulations that grant distinct preferential treatments to each ﬁrm in the sample each year is
collected. The source of the information about preferential treatments is the comprehensive database of
Russia’s regional legislation “Consultant Plus” (www.consultant.ru/Software/Systems/RegLaw). It is worth
noting that preferential treatment data have a couple of signiﬁcant drawbacks: First, the importance of
diﬀerent preferential treatments cannot by quantiﬁed (i.e., we cannot compare the beneﬁts ﬁrms get from
a tax break or a transfer of a large piece of land to them); thus, the data are just a count of the number
of legislative acts with distinct preferential treatments. Second, authors identify preferential treatment only
when texts of the law contain direct reference to a ﬁrm. Despite these drawbacks, the measures of regional-
level capture and ﬁrms’ political inﬂuence survive a number of reality checks. Looking at the ﬁve largest
recipients of preferential treatments per region in any particular year seems to be suﬃcient to construct
reliable measures of political power for ﬁrms and state capture for regions because for the vast majority of
years and regions (well above 90%), fewer than six ﬁrms receive preferential treatments. For a more detailed
description of the data see Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005).
Cross-section of ownership and control in Russia
Ownership data that we start with are described by Guriev and Rachivsky (2005) as follows: “The project
identiﬁed the structure of control for about 1,700 large ﬁrms in 45 sectors of Russian economy... The sectors
were selected based on their size in order for the survey to cover as large a portion of the economy as
possible... The next stage was to target the largest establishments and ﬁrms within the sectors. In industry,
for example, our ﬁrms represented 35 percent of employment and 85 percent of sales of the selected sectors.
Finally, economists and business journalists interviewed investment banks, consultancies, business advisors,
information agencies and other institutions. They identiﬁed the main controlling owners of each ﬁrm and
the portion of the ﬁrm they owned and also any subsidiaries owned by the ﬁrms. This in turn generated
new sets of ﬁrms to be investigated - subsidiaries and corporate owners. A chain would stop downward when
a ﬁrm owned no subsidiaries and would stop upward when an “ultimate owner” or “controlling party” was
identiﬁed. The data were checked and supplemented with publicly accessible information.” (p. 132).
Histories of Russian companies
The Labyrinth data set The data set contains informal but very detailed account of the histories of most
Russian companies. The histories include records of all the major ownership changes. The data set can be
found at http://www.panorama.ru/info/labir.html.
31Table A.1: Types of regional capture
Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Adygeya republic R R R R R R R R
Altai krai R NO MR MR NO R R R
Altai republic NO R R R R R R R
Amur oblast R R R R R R R NO
Arkhangelsk oblast NO NO NO NO NO R R R
Astrakhan oblast R R MR R R R R R
Bashkortostan republic R R R R NO NO NO R
Belgorod oblast MR NO NO NO NO MR NO NO
Bryansk oblast NO R R NO NO R NO R
Chelyabinsk oblast R R R R R MR MR NO
Chita oblast NO R NO R NO R NO NO
Chuvash republic NO NO NO R R R R R
Dagestan republic NO R R R R NO NO R
Evrei autonomous oblast NO NO NO R R NO NO R
Irkutsk oblast NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Ivanovo oblast R R R R R R R R
Kabardino-Balkar republic NO R R R R R R NO
Kaliningrad oblast R R NO NO R R R R
Kalmyk republic NO NO NO R R R NO NO
Kaluga oblast R NO NO NO NO R R R
Kamchatka oblast NO NO NO NO R R R NO
Karelia republic NO MR R NO MR NO NO MR
Kemerovo oblast NO NO R R MR MR MR R
Khabarovsk krai R R R R NO R R R
Khakasia republic NO NO NO NO NO NO NO R
Khanty-Mansi autonomous okru NO NO NO R NO NO NO
Kirov oblast R R R R R NO MR MR
Komi republic R R R R MR NO R MR
Kostroma oblast R R R R NO MR MR MR
Krasnodar krai NO NO R R NO NO NO MR
Krasnoyarsk krai NO NO NO MR MR NO R NO
Kurgan oblast NO NO NO NO NO R R R
Kursk oblast MR R MR MR MR MR MR MR
Lipetsk oblast R R NO NO R R R R
Magadan oblast NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Mari-El republic NO R NO NO R NO NO R
Mordovia republic R R R R R R R R
Moscow city R R R R NO R R R
Moskow oblast NO R R R R R R NO
Murmansk oblast MR NO NO MR MR MR NO NO
Nizhny Novgorod oblast R NO NO R NO NO NO R
Novgorod oblast NO NO R R NO R R R
Novosibirsk oblast R R NO R R R R MR
Omsk oblast MR MR MR MR MR MR MR MR
Orenburg oblast MR + R MR + R R MR + R NO MR NO NO
Oryol oblast R R R MR MR MR NO NO
Penza oblast NO MR MR R R R R MR
Perm oblast NO NO R R R R NO NO
Primorskii krai R NO NO R NO R R NO
Pskov oblast R NO NO R NO NO NO R
Rostov oblast R R R R R R MR + R NO
Ryazan oblast R MR NO NO NO NO NO NO
Sakha (Yakutia) republic MR R R R MR MR R MR
Sakhalin oblast R R R R R MR NO NO
Samara oblast MR R R MR R R NO NO
Saratov oblast NO MR MR MR MR MR MR MR
Smolensk oblast R R R R NO R NO NO
St. Petersburg city NO NO R R R NO MR NO
Stavropol krai R MR MR MR MR MR R R
Sverdlovsk oblast R R R MR NO R NO NO
Tambov oblast R NO R R R R R R
Tatarstan republic R R R R R R NO NO
Tomsk oblast R R MR MR MR R R R
Tula oblast NO R R R R R NO R
Tver oblast NO NO R R R R NO MR
Tyumen oblast R MR NO R NO NO NO NO
Udmurtia Republic NO MR + R MR MR MR R R NO
Ulyanovsk oblast NO R MR MR NO NO NO NO
Vladimir oblast R R NO R R R R R
Volgograd oblast MR R R R R R R NO
Vologda oblast MR NO MR NO MR R MR R
Voronezh oblast R R R MR NO R MR MR
Yaroslavl oblast MR MR MR MR MR MR MR MR
Note: “MR,” “R” and “NO” denote diﬀerent types of capture of the neighboring regions: multiregional,
regional, and no capture, respectively. “MR + R” indicates that one half of preferential treatments a region
goes to a multiregional group and the other half to a regional group.
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